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Climate change benchmarking: Constructing a
sustainable future?
CAROLINE KUZEMKO
Abstract. This article analyses discourses on climate change and mitigation through the
deconstruction of European Union (EU) rhetoric and practices on climate benchmarking.
It critically examines the motivations behind climate benchmarking, the methods used to
construct international benchmarks, and the reasons for variety in domestic compliance.
Germany and the United Kingdom are analysed as cases where domestic politics drive very
different reactions to the practice of climate mitigation, differences that have been largely
hidden by the type of quantiﬁcation that EU benchmarking involves. Through an explora-
tion of the methods used to formulate climate benchmarks, the article demonstrates that
these commitments have privileged certain responses over others, and thus helped to paint a
picture of EU benchmarks as ‘reformist’ but not ‘radical’. EU climate benchmarks often end
up concealing more than they reveal, making it difﬁcult to fully engage with the scale and
complexity of the far-reaching domestic changes that are required in order to comply with
agreed international benchmarks. The deﬁciencies of benchmarks as a mechanism for driving
long-term sustainable change, and importantly discouraging harmful policies, may ultimately
undermine their credibility as a means for governing climate change at a distance in the EU.
Caroline Kuzemko is part of an EPSRC funded project, ‘Innovation and Governance
(IGov)’, based in the Energy Policy Group at the University of Exeter. She has research
interests in energy and climate governance, (de)politicisation, and institutional change. She is
a the (co-)convenor of two international, interdisciplinary academic networks: the PSA
sponsored ‘Anti-Politics and Depoliticisation Special Group’ (APDSG) and the ‘Political
Economy of Energy in Europe and Russia’ (PEEER). Caroline has recently published
The Energy Security-Climate Nexus: Institutional Change in the UK and Beyond (2013
Palgrave Macmillan) and articles in the Journal of European Public Policy, and Policy and
Politics (2014).
Introduction
For at least thirty years some international organisations (IOs), governments, and
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have worked hard to establish and diffuse
new global norms in order to mitigate for anthropogenic climate change. A variety of
speeches and texts associated with these organisations reveal arguments about the
severity of implications for humankind if climate change is not mitigated, but
arguably less understanding of the scale of the task that is being set nor of the degree
to which fossil fuels are embedded within current economic models and political
relations. Amongst international organisations some degree of agreement about how
to proceed has been reached. There are a number of binding international climate
targets including those agreed within the United Nations Framework on Climate
Change Convention (UNFCCC) and the EU 20-20-20 agreement. There has been a
proliferation of new climate agencies, committees, and international instruments,
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including benchmarks, tasked with delivering these targets. The EU is taken here as
an important actor, some say a leader, within such governance processes of trying to
mitigate for climate change within severe temporal constraints. In this way their
successes and failures are considered important in setting precedence of possibility
but also because governance methods chosen and endorsed here may be followed
elsewhere.
This article peers beneath these, at least rhetorically, committed climate discourses
by exploring EU climate change benchmarking practices. Benchmarks are understood
here as one important method utilised within the process of establishing new
international climate norms and driving associated sustainable policy and behaviour
changes. Climate benchmarks are the point of reference against which individual
country’s climate performance may be compared or assessed – climate targets agreed
internationally, or in this case regionally, are used as the standard of measurement.
There are those that have argued that climate mitigation targets should be too
important for or above politics, often understood in terms of conﬂict, whilst others
claim that politics gets in the way of successful climate mitigation and sustainable
energy transitions.1 In that benchmarks reﬂect decisions made and targets set as a
result of political agreement about what should be done it is understood that they
should not be open to contestation. This article argues, by contrast, that benchmarks
are themselves highly political in a number of different ways. Firstly in that they have
been constructed partly based upon certain political ideas about how best to govern;
secondly in that, in related fashion, they reward certain practices and behaviours
whilst ignoring others; and thirdly in that compliance with benchmarks has wide
ranging politico-economic implications for compliance countries even in the instance
that those countries were involved in the design of climate benchmarks.
This Special Issue is based upon the notion that different areas of benchmarking,
according to governance domain, need to be understood on their own terms as well as
collectively. In paying close attention to the speciﬁc ideas and assumptions that
qualify and colour climate benchmarks this article moves beyond claims that global
governance practices, like benchmarks, embody mainly market liberal orthodoxies. In
order to better understand the precise nature of climate change benchmarks, this
article ﬁrst of all explores the somewhat mixed range of motivations behind the
establishment of climate governance. It then reveals the complex mix of ideas and
assumptions that have become embedded within benchmarks in order to explain why
it is that certain politico-economic practices are seen and rewarded and others ignored
by benchmarks. The intention here is not to argue for or against benchmarks but to
reveal more about compromises reached and how these have limited the design and
scope of targets and benchmarks.
Having revealed some of the character of climate benchmarks the next section
explores what this actually means in practice. The approach taken here intends not
just to assess whether benchmarks inﬂuence practice but to claim that the ways in
which climate benchmarks have been designed are signiﬁcant for domestic policy and
politics but also, ultimately, for the legitimacy of climate governance. The method
chosen here of making such assessments, and relating constructions to practices, is to
study compliance at the domestic level in Germany and the UK, two developed and
ostensibly climate aware countries. These countries are chosen partly because they
1 Robert Garner, Environmental Politics: the Age of Climate Change (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2011).
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claim leadership in mitigation but also because they both score well and at similar
levels in ofﬁcial EU benchmarking indexes – as such they are often held up as
countries that pursue ‘best practice’ in climate governance.2 Indeed, some climate
indexes place the UK ahead of Germany, for example the high proﬁle Climate
Change Performance Index (CCPI) ranks the UK second only to Denmark whilst
Germany languishes at number 19 (see Box 1).3 This benchmarking position appears
puzzling in the light of qualitative studies of climate policy and practices that rate
Germany ahead of the UK.4 By considering how climate benchmarks are constructed
and how this inter-relates with compliance this article offers some explanation as to
why such anomalies exist.
Global climate governance and embedded ideas
The approach to benchmarking taken here sits within broader constructivist IPE
approaches to international governance and organisations (IOs), in that it explores
how benchmarks are constructed rather than taking them as given.5 Benchmarks are
conceptualised here as embedded within but also as performing vital functions, of
comparison and compliance, within processes of governing internationally. In this
case climate benchmarks sit within governance attempts to set new and sustainable
behavioural norms internationally. Benchmarks are further conceptualised as
constructed objectivity, as reﬂecting existing knowledge, as power relations, and as
weaving together the discursive and material worlds.6 This latter is achieved through
establishing quantitative benchmarking standards, often universally deﬁned, and then
encouraging compliance with those standards through measurement, comparison
and, in some instances, naming and shaming.7 Benchmarks as practice can have the
ability to constitute a new common sense that narrows governance options down and
normalises certain norms.8 Arguably, however, in order for such processes to be
successful there needs to be a degree of at least perceived legitimacy associated both
with set benchmark standards and those actors that have set the standards.
2 European Environment Agency (EEA), ‘Report No. 10/2013: Trends and Projections in Europe 2013:
Tracking Progress Towards Europe’s Climate and Energy Targets Until 2020’ (Copenhagen: European
Environment Agency, 2013). See also International Energy Agency World Energy Outlook, ‘Special
Report 2013: Redrawing the Energy Climate Map’ (Paris: International Energy Agency, 2013).
3 J. Burck, F. Marten and C. Bals, The Climate Change Performance Index: Results 2014 (Brussels:
Climate Action Network Europe, 2014).
4 See, for example, J. Mikler and N. Harrison, ‘Varieties of capitalism and technological innovation for
climate change mitigation’, New Political Economy, 17:2 (2012), pp. 179–208; D. Toke and V. Laubner,
‘Anglo-Saxon and German approaches to neoliberalism and environmental policy: the case of ﬁnancing
renewable energy’, Geoforum, 38 (2007), pp. 677–87; J. Rosenow, N. Eyre, C. Rhode, and V. Buerger,
‘Overcoming the upfront investment barrier – comparison of the German CO2 building rehabilitation
programme and the British Green Deal’, Energy and Environment, 24:1/3 (2012), pp. 127–36; C. Mitchell,
D. Bauknecht, and P. M. Connor, ‘Effectiveness through risk reduction: a comparison of the renewable
obligation in England and Wales and the feed-in system in Germany’, Energy Policy, 34 (2006),
pp. 297–305.
5 A. Broome and L. Seabrooke, ‘Seeing like an international organisation’, New Political Economy, 71:1
(2012), pp. 1–16; A. Broome, ‘Constructivism in international political economy’, in R. Palan (ed.),
Global Political Economy: Contemporary Theories (London and New York: Routledge, 2013); H. K.
Hansen and A. Mühlen-Schulte, ‘The power of numbers in global governance’, Journal of International
Relations and Development, 15 (2012), pp. 455–65.
6 A. Broome and J. Quirk, ‘Governing the world at a distance: the practice of global benchmarking’,
Review of International Studies, 41:5 (2015), pp. 819–41.
7 Ibid.
8 L. Seabrooke, ‘Pragmatic numbers: the IMF, ﬁnancial reform, and policy learning in least likely
environments’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 15 (2012), p. 489.
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As already observed elsewhere, however, there are differences between IOs – even
between those operating within single policy areas.9 A variety of modus operand,
objectives and internal policy debates have been observed, as well as claims made that
there is more than one Washington Consensus. Starting out from this position, this
Special Issue as a whole disaggregates benchmarks by analysing practices separated
out according to different transnational policy domains. A further method of
disaggregating between benchmarks – suggested in the opening article of this Special
Issue – is to group benchmarks according to typologies based on actors, who does the
benchmarking, and the purpose or type of international practice that benchmarks are
being used to actuate. Within this typology, the CPPI has been described as sitting
within ‘type IV’ – conceptualised as being either explicitly or implicitly geared
towards transnational advocacy in particular issue areas and used by a civil society
organisation. There is certainly some merit in this description – climate benchmarks
are indeed used as part of an overt attempt to make the world a better place by
measuring countries against internationally agreed targets.
However climate benchmarks, in that they are so widely used by IOs to
measure climate performance, also sit within ‘type II’ or ‘benchmarking as
international governance’ and are less geared towards the promotion of individual
state’s national interests. It is therefore considered important to reveal here how
benchmarks have been constructed, what practices at state level they reward and
allow, and what implications this has in practice.10 Given the degree to which
benchmarks are used to establish and measure progress towards new norms by IOs
and civil society it is important, for the success and legitimacy of climate governance,
to assess whether benchmarks do, indeed, encourage behaviours consistent with
mitigation and falling CO2 levels. This is achieved here through disaggregating
benchmarks in another way – by revealing and unpacking the knowledge structures
that underpin them through an interrogation of EU climate governance norms.
This approach is based on the assumption that ideas are key variables capable of
inﬂuencing governance choices – both at the domestic and international level – and
that by being speciﬁc about ideas we can be more overt about what existing
knowledge benchmarks are based on.11 The emphasis here is on ideas as inﬂuential
within processes of establishing new areas of governance given that climate
benchmarks, and the targets upon which they are set, are part of the process of
establishing new climate norms and of driving new and sustainable behaviours.
Sociological institutionalists suggest that ideas play multiple roles during periods of,
often domestic, policy change: alternative ideas can challenge existing orthodoxies by
identifying weaknesses and problems and by suggesting alternative solutions to
problems. But, importantly, embedded orthodoxies can also constrain and colour
what types of new objectives and policy instruments are ultimately agreed and
pursued.12 By identifying these multiple roles for ideas we can understand that new
governance norms are established through the push and pull between competing, but
9 Broome and Seabrooke, ‘Seeing like an IO’, p. 8.
10 Broome and Quirk, ‘Governing the world at a distance’.
11 On ideas and institutions see J. L. Campbell, ‘Institutional analysis and the role of ideas in political
economy’, Theory and Society, 27:3 (1998), pp. 377–409; S. Berman, The Social Democratic Moment:
Ideas and Politics in the Making of Interwar Europe (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1998); M. Blyth,
Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2002); C. Hay, ‘Narrating crisis: the discursive construction of the winter of
discontent’, Sociology, 30:2 (1996), pp. 253–77.
12 Blyth, Great Transformations; Hay, ‘Narrating crisis…’.
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not always compatible, sets of ideas revealing a more nuanced understanding of what
knowledge international governance is based upon.13
Taking ideas and knowledge as inﬂuential is a common approach utilised in both
international governance literatures but usually to describe path-dependencies. The
forms of knowledge enacted through international governance processes are often
described as generic. Such descriptions are not surprising given claims by some IOs
that they are arbiters of knowledge about ‘world’s best practices’ and ‘good
governance’ and claims that countries performing well according to benchmarks also
represent ‘best practice’.14 Legitimacy of norms and rules are inferred in the titles of
‘best’ and ‘good’ and it is also implied that countries following such practices will
succeed in meeting targets. Such claims have led scholars to conceptualise some IOs
as deﬁning and enforcing governance according to ‘Washington Consensus’ norms,
underpinned by liberal economic ideas about the role of the state in economic
governance, economic efﬁciency, and ﬁscal responsibility.
Such claims are also common within some constructivist and IPE climate
governance literatures – indeed it has been claimed that in order to gain acceptance
internationally for climate action environmental concerns have been absorbed into the
prevailing liberal economic order and associated power relations.15 In this vein liberal
economic ideas have been presented as erecting intellectual boundaries around the
scope of policy imagination available to IOs in their everyday activities but also,
importantly, around the design of benchmarks that seek to impact upon policy at the
national level.16 There is a small point of departure here in that climate governance is
conceptualised as being informed by varied sets of ideas simultaneously, more in line
with observations above about change taking place as a result of the push and pull
between different sets of ideas. Climate governance is taken here not just as a case of
decision-making during a process of change as bounded by one framework of ideas
but as a coming together of different sets of ideas to motivate and inform the design of
this emerging governance arena.17 Multiple sets of ideas, environmental, scientiﬁc,
and market liberal are embodied, enacted, and reiﬁed through climate benchmarks
making this an emergent, highly political but complex area for analysis.
Such observations inform the methodology used here in that the article identiﬁes
and considers the inﬂuence of the different sets of ideas within processes of creating
and utilising benchmarks at the international level. Environmental and scientiﬁc ideas
are included to the extent that they have identiﬁed and outlined climate change as a
problem that requires action thereby setting the new governance objective of reducing
emissions.18 Once accepted, however, this objective became coloured and constrained
by orthodox knowledge within IOs about how to govern globally, that is, by setting
targets, requiring countries to follow and assessing their progress using benchmarks.
In a further stage ideas about the importance of economic growth to sustainability,
about treating climate separately from environment, and about the need for energy
13 C. Kuzemko, The Energy Security Climate Nexus: Institutional Change in the UK and Beyond
(Basingstoke and New York, 2013), p. 180.
14 Broome and Seabrooke, ‘Seeing like an IO’, p. 7.
15 See, in particular, S. Bernstein, The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism (New York: Columbia
University Press 2001); but also H. Stevenson, ‘India and international norms of climate governance: a
constructivist analysis of normative congruence building’, Review of International Studies, 37:3 (2011),
pp. 997–1019 (p. 1001); and P. Newell, ‘The elephant in the room: Capitalism and environmental
change’, Global Environmental Change, 21 (2011), pp. 4–6.
16 Broome and Seabrooke, ‘Seeing like an IO’, p. 2.
17 Kuzemko, The Energy Security-Climate Nexus, pp. 179–84.
18 See also Stevenson, ‘India and international norms of climate governance’, p. 1001.
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system transition are also shown to be embedded within climate norms.
Understanding in more detail how ideas have structured benchmarks helps to
reveal what practices are measured and encouraged at the international level as well as
why. In many ways, however, this article suggests that what climate benchmarks do
not see is as important as the behaviours that are encouraged.
In order to fully understand the practical signiﬁcance of these constructions one
further step is taken here by comparing processes of compliance with benchmarks in
Germany and the UK. This is done in order to trace the substantive but variable
effects of climate benchmarks as constructed – arguably a relative silence within
existing benchmarking and climate governance literatures. Some climate governance
scholars have suggested that the different domestic contexts and social, economic, and
political processes involved in attempting to comply with climate benchmarks are
consequential.19 Rarely, however, is this claim explored in detail. It has also been
claimed, within comparative climate scholarship, that different institutional
arrangements have been better suited to building systems of sustainable change in
response to climate targets.20 Domestic ideas and institutions in this way colour how
compliance takes place. What this article suggests is that such differences are not
‘seen’ by benchmarks because they are designed to simplify and quantify – the relative
positions of Germany and the UK on EU climate benchmarks being a case in point.
As such they are unable to recognise how domestic institutions affect a country’s
capacity and willingness to comply, or indeed the scale of political and energy system
changes required. Furthermore, what activities are and are not measured by
benchmarks becomes crucial to countries rankings and to which countries are held
up as examples of good practice.
Benchmarks can and do, however, change and it is precisely for this reason that
the politics of how compliance plays out in practice is important. IOs, governments,
and NGOs have arguably been working from a far less established framework of ideas
about what is right, what standards should be and how to measure them, given the
somewhat unprecedented nature of climate mitigation as an area for governance.
Climate agreements that have been reached, such as the EU’s 20-20-20, have been
hard won but are also are overtly subject to further renegotiation and potential
ﬂuidity as targets are all temporally ﬁxed.21 Much analysis of benchmarks assumes a
one-way relationship inferring that policy is prior to compliance.22 However,
compliers with climate benchmarks are also important negotiators in setting new
targets and this can be taken as one example of a ‘recursive loop’.23 In this way, how
compliance happens, including resistances and contestations, really matters.
International governance literatures, to the extent that they fail to consider these
substantive and varied inter-relationships, stop short of fully realising the signiﬁcance
19 See also I. Bailey and H. Compston, ‘Geography and the politics of climate policy’, Geography Compass,
4:8 (2010), pp. 1097–14 (p. 1097); Garner, Environmental Politics, p. 5; P. Burnell, ‘Democracy, demo-
cratization and climate change: Complex relationships’, Democratization, 19:5 (2012), pp. 813–42
(pp. 815, 821).
20 M. Lehtonen and F. Kern, ‘Deliberative socio-technical transitions’, in I. Scrase and G. MacKerron
(eds), Energy for the Future: A New Agenda (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Mikler and
Harrison, ‘Varieties of capitalism and technological innovation’; see also Garner, Environmental
Politics, p. 4.
21 In line with observations made by Stevenson, ‘India and international norms of climate governance’,
p. 998.
22 See O. J. Sending and J. H. Sande Lie, ‘The limits of global authority: World Bank benchmarks in
Ethiopia and Malawi’, Review of International Studies, 41:5 (2015), pp. 993–1010.
23 Broome and Quirk, ‘Governing the world at a distance’, p. 11.
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of benchmarks for compliance countries but also interconnections between
constructions, outcomes and further reconstructions of governance norms.
Climate governance and benchmarking as reformist
Global warming is one amongst a number of issues that have been raised and pursued
by the international environmental movement, much of which has operated for many
decades under a different philosophy to most other political perspectives.24 Indeed, it
is the environmental focus on inter-relationships between humans and nature that has
helped us to conceive of climate change not as something inevitable but as an outcome
of a range of human actions and as part of growing natural degradation. Such
problems presented by humankind’s actions have been conceptualised as global, given
that as humans we live and operate in an interconnected fashion within the conﬁnes of
the earth and its atmosphere – making global warming the ultimate global problem.
What has further motivated a desire for global action is the emergence of a scientiﬁc
consensus on anthropogenic climate change as well as lists of potential implications
for humankind that have been associated with warming of above 2°C over
preindustrial levels.25 These notions have collectively come to form one of the bases
of current international governance knowledge about climate change and the need for
worldwide action.
It is important to note, however, that much environmental thought has also
presented distinct normative challenges to global, as well as some domestic,
governance orthodoxies. Environmental debates in the 1970s were informed by
claims about natural limits to economic growth, whilst earlier literatures emphasised
the links between capitalism, economic growth, fossil fuel use, and environmental
degradation.26 Indeed, models of growth since the industrial revolution have been
based on ever-emergent new mechanisms and technologies that in turn were largely
dependent on ever-greater energy use. From this perspective, modern capitalism
is an integral part of the problem of climate change and solving it would for this
reason require deep structural change – including a move away from common
emphasis on economic growth.27 This is what is referred to as a ‘radical’
environmental position.28
Despite growing degrees of élite political consensus around the notion that
humankind is responsible for climate change and that action must be taken, the battle
to establish an international climate framework was long and arduous and included
many compromises from these original environmental and scientiﬁc debates.29 Steven
Bernstein explores in detail how environmental debates of the 1970s became imbued
with existing power relations and liberal ideational orthodoxies emanating from
24 Garner, Environmental Politics, ch. 1.
25 IPCC (2007), in A. Giddens, The Politics of Climate Change (Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press,
2009) p. 22; see also Stevenson, ‘India and international norms of climate governance’, pp. 997–8;
Burnell, ‘Democracy, democratization and climate change’, p. 818. For example, one predication in
Burnell’s work is that global warming will result in 26 million ‘climate displaced people’ in the next
twenty years.
26 P. Newell and M. Paterson, Climate Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010),
pp. 12–13.
27 J. Dryzek, D. Downes, C. Hunold, D. Schlosberg, and H. Hernes, Green States and Social Movements:
Environmentalism in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany and Norway (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2003).
28 Garner, Environmental Politics, pp. 7–10
29 Bernstein, The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism, p. 32.
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within international governance circles.30 Global climate governance has through
these processes been constructed through the co-option of only some environmental
and climate science ideas whilst rejecting others. Indeed, amongst others it was those
ideas that posed more of a challenge to Western liberal structures of growth and
consumption that were sacriﬁced.31 In these ways international climate governance, as
currently structured, can be referred to as reﬂecting a ‘reformist’ position as it embeds
the idea that it is possible to effectively incorporate climate protection within
pre-existing political and economic structures of modern industrial society.32 As
explained in more detail below, from a radical position this approach is likely to result
in failure to protect our environment and in governance measures that are too weak to
make sufﬁcient difference.
Through this compromised reformist approach international climate norms that
have emerged, like other forms of international governance, are based upon setting
international targets against which countries can be measured. Targets are understood
here as speciﬁc, deﬁned outcomes towards which (policy) efforts should be directed. It
is assumed that the acceptance of legally binding targets will force change across a
wide range of policy areas at the national level and ultimately produce changes in
practices allowing for the rate of warming to slow and then be limited to 2°C.33
Indeed, the notion that universal standards can and should drive other policy choices
is deeply embedded within EU climate governance and the associated policy of
mainstreaming. As EU Climate Commissioner, Connie Hedegaard, recently
observed, ‘(c)limate solutions are all around – it’s now on us to make them the
norm’.34
In terms of speciﬁc targets, although new 2030 EU targets were agreed in October
2014, benchmarks have so far been based on the EU 20-20-20 package which includes
a greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction target of 20 per cent over 1990 levels.
This emissions reduction commitment is above and beyond that of the Kyoto
Protocol giving rise to claims that the EU is a leader in climate mitigation. However,
the 20-20-20 package also includes other speciﬁc targets not included in Kyoto: to
produce 20 per cent of EU energy consumption from renewable sources and to
improve EU energy efﬁciency by 20 per cent both by 2020.35 Here we can see the
inﬂuence of ideas about inter-linkages between energy (as dominated by fossil fuels)
and climate change – indeed these targets imply that energy systems must change in
order to mitigate successfully.36 These targets form the basis of various EU climate
benchmarks, discussed in more detail below, and are accompanied by a range of
preferred measures and instruments designed to enable countries to meet set targets
30 Ibid.; See also P. Newell and M. Paterson, Climate Capitalism: Global Warming and the Transformation
of the Global Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Stevenson, ‘India and interna-
tional norms of climate governance’, p. 999.
31 H. Stevenson, ‘Representing green radicalism: the limits of state-based representation in global climate
governance’, Review of International Studies, 40:1 (2014), p. 184.
32 Garner, Environmental Politics, p. 8.
33 M. Kneuer, ‘Who is greener? Climate action and political regimes: Trade-offs for national and inter-
national actors’, Democratization, 19:5 (2012), p. 865.
34 Connie Hedegaard, European Commission News (2014), available at: {http://ec.europa.eu/commission_
2010-2014/hedegaard/headlines/news/2013-12-20_01_en.htm} accessed 20 April 2015.
35 New 2030 targets are: to reduce GHG emissions by at least 40 per cent below the 1990 level (binding at
the EU level); to increase the share of renewables to at least 27 per cent (binding at the EU level); and to
increase energy efﬁciency by at least 27 per cent (indicative only), available at: {http://ec.europa.eu/clima/
policies/2030/index_en.htm} accessed 20 April 2015.
36 It is estimated that up to 83 per cent of CO2 emissions in Annex 1 countries come from the energy sector –
see IEA, CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion: Highlights (Paris: IEA, 2013).
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such as the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and the Energy Efﬁciency
Directive.37
For some, given the emergence of scientiﬁc consensus on climate change and its
causes, and associated studies about probable consequences, there should be no
politics of climate change. Frustration is often expressed that possibilities already exist
for climate mitigation to proceed but that politics, often deﬁned separately and at the
national level, actually stands in the way of achievements.38 There are, furthermore,
claims that climate change, given that it is so universal and important, should be
taken out of ‘partisan’ political competition in order to give mitigation strategies the
secure tenure needed in order to work.39 This notion of climate change action being
above politics coincides well with liberal institutionalist ideas about setting technical
standards as ‘objective’measures against which performance can be judged.40 Climate
action should, from these perspectives, be about technical transitions along
measurable metrics towards lower emissions and a clean and sustainable future.41
The approach taken in this article, however, denies the objectivity of climate targets
and benchmarks but instead argues that their construction reﬂects politics, power
relations, and complex and varied forms of knowledge about climate and energy.
Climate benchmarks and governance targets
There has been a proliferation of climate benchmarks over the past decade almost all
of which are used for transnational advocacy purposes.42 For example, the high
proﬁle CCPI, accumulated by Germanwatch, is used not only to assess and judge
performance, against set standards, but also to enhance transparency and raise
awareness of climate change via media channels and amongst political actors – with
some naming and shaming also involved. Some attempt is made to highlight countries
with best-practice policies – the inference being that less successful countries should
follow their lead.43 This makes it important that countries highlighted as ‘good’ are
really on a long-term path to a more sustainable system. A large proportion of climate
benchmarking is, however, undertaken by IOs. In fact all parties to EU, and Kyoto,
agreements must be measured, as accurately as possible, against their commitments
for the targets to have any practical effect.
EU climate benchmarks are highly quantitative and numbers oriented reﬂecting
the targets upon which they are based – it requires a certain level of understanding of
the science of climate change and of how different forms of energy function to
comprehend them in any depth.44 These benchmarks are put together annually to
measure performance against GHG emissions reduction targets at the collective EU
37 See DG Ener website, available at: {https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-efﬁciency} accessed
20 April 2015.
38 I. Bailey and H. Compston, ‘Geography and the politics of climate change’, Geography Compass, 4:8
(2010), pp. 1097–8.
39 A. Giddens, The Politics of Climate Change, p. 189.
40 See H. Compston and I. Bailey, ‘Comparing Climate Policies: the Strong Climate Policy Index’, Paper
prepared for the PSA Annual Conference, Cardiff, March 2013.
41 Garner, Environmental Politics, p. 6.
42 See Broome and Quirk, ‘Governing the world at a distance’.
43 J. Burck, L. Hermwille, and C. Bals, ‘The Climate Change Performance Index: Background and
methodology’, Germanwatch (November 2013), p. 4, available at: {https://germanwatch.org/en/download/
8579.pdf} accessed 20 April 2014.
44 See European Environment Agency, ‘Trends and Projections in Europe: Tracking Progress Towards
Europe’s Climate and Energy Targets Until 2020’, EEA Report No. 10/2013; Burck et al., The Climate
Change Performance Index; Compston and Bailey, ‘Comparing Climate Policies’.
Climate change benchmarking 977
level and against the individual targets that have been agreed for each member state.
Aggregate EU, and individual country, renewable energy data is collected by a data
collection agency, Eurostat, based within the European Commission.45 These
measures, along with efﬁciency data, are then combined in the annual European
Environment Agency (EEA) report which serves as the principal EU climate
benchmarking index. Interestingly when compiling benchmarks the EU often uses
EEA data but they, in turn, rely heavily on information provided by member states.46
The formal process of EU monitoring, reporting and veriﬁcation (MRV) of GHG
emissions takes place annually during the European Semester. Measuring against
climate standards is, in addition, an emerging and inherently tricky business. With
regard to measuring energy efﬁciency against targets different countries have varied
criteria for assessing performance – not all of which are comparable.47
In these ways internationally agreed targets are central to climate governance but
they also become the basis for climate benchmarks. In turn, benchmarks embody
targets and become the principal method of measuring compliance success. Without
measurement countries, and the EU, cannot be held accountable for missing targets. So
intertwined are targets and benchmarks that in the language of EU climate governance
binding targets are often referred to, in a quite inter-changeable manner, as
benchmarks. The uneasy compromise between environmental ideas and liberal ideas
about how to govern for global phenomena has so far resulted in an EU system
designed to encourage behaviour change but using pre-existing governance methods.
EU climate benchmarks: What is seen and what is not
Technocratic, universal governance approaches have already attracted some criticism
within climate change literatures.48 This is partly because, like critiques of
international governance practices in other policy domains, technical standards
tend not to question the assumptions underlying them but also narrow down what
human activity is seen.49 This applies to EU benchmarks in that GHG emissions
reduction, production of renewable energy, and improving efﬁciency have become
what EU monitoring agents see and reward – but always with an important time
lag and with little means of noting those countries that are working towards
more progressive, long-term climate targets. Two other assumptions embedded
in EU climate benchmarks, outlined below, further assist in delineating what is
allowed but also what is not seen – assumptions that are shown here to both hide
and actively approve behaviours that exacerbate climate change and environmental
damage.
45 DG Climate, ‘Progress Towards the 2020 Targets: the European Semester’ (2014) available at: {http://ec.
europa.eu/clima/policies/g-gas/progress/index_en.htm} accessed 20 April 2015.
46 European Environment Agency, ‘Trends and Projections in Europe’, p. 15; see also European Com-
mission, ‘Elements of the Union Greenhouse Gas Inventory System and the Quality Assurance and
Control (QA/QC) Programme’, Brussels 12 August 2013, SWD (2013) 308 ﬁnal.
47 J. Rosenow and R. Galvin, ‘Evaluating the evaluations: Evidence from energy efﬁciency programmes in
Germany and the UK’, Energy and Buildings, 62 (2013), pp. 450–8
48 V. Mathur, S. Aﬁonis, J. Paavola, A. Dougill, and L. Stringer, ‘Experiences of host communities with
carbon market projects: Towards multi-level climate justice’, Climate Policy, 14:1 (2014), pp. 42–62;
P. Newell and A. Bumpus, ‘The global political ecology of the clean development mechanism’, Global
Environmental Politics, 12:4 (2012), pp. 49–67.
49 See J. Scott, Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 76 in Broome and Seabrooke, ‘Seeing like an IO’, p. 7.
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Economic growth is ‘sustainable’
One important assumption built into climate benchmarks has to do with the accepted
role of economic growth within Western capitalisms. Speciﬁcally, as part of the
process of compromise discussed above, a decision was made to depart from the
singular emphasis on environmental variables when deﬁning what is sustainable to
include economic growth as part of the deﬁnition.50 This is evident within EU climate
discourse to the extent that the framing of environmental issues rests on and includes a
primary concern with economic growth.51 The question of how climate change
mitigation and economic growth relate to one another is by no means new in that it in
many ways deﬁnes the split between climate reformists and radicals. Reformists and
ecological modernisation theory suggest not only that economic growth is compatible
with environmental protection but the two are, in fact, mutually reinforcing. In
practice, reformist assumptions have led to ‘win-win’ rhetoric about climate and
sustainable energy objectives being compatible with other EU institutions and a stress
on the ability for countries to be simultaneously ‘green and competitive’.52 Such
arguments stand in open contrast to environmental ideas about limits to growth,
referenced above, that initially motivated climate governance.
It is hard to locate in detail the ways in which assumptions about the importance
of economic growth have qualiﬁed climate benchmarks and how they are
formulated – there are, for example, no speciﬁc economic growth metrics included
and growth is as such not overtly rewarded. It is illustrative here, however, to consider
brieﬂy climate governance within the wider EU governance context. Climate targets
have been made ‘headline goals’ of the Europe 2020 strategy, which is fundamentally
about delivering growth, understood in terms of recovery from economic crisis. This
growth, however, is qualiﬁed as needing to be ‘smart, sustainable and inclusive’.53 The
qualiﬁcation of growth as sustainable refers in particular to the move towards a low
carbon economy and can been interpreted as part of the mainstreaming of new
climate standards into other governance areas – in line with the assumption that
growth can be green and with a win-win, reformist agenda.
The resultant position on growth is, however, slightly more complex in that the
relationship between economic growth and climate standards as already suggested
also works the other way – climate benchmarks actively incorporate an allowance for
economic growth. Member states are judged against country emissions targets that
are highly differentiated according to economic growth and development but also
according to sectors of the economy. In this way benchmarks do recognise some
difference between countries in terms of capacity to comply but principally according
to metrics of developed or less developed according the GDP per capita and/or
according to which industries are understood to be important to economic growth
and therefore excluded. Countries like Bulgaria and Romania, for example, are
benchmarked against targets that allow for them to continue to grow their emissions
50 Bernstein, The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism, pp. 70–1; A. Jordan, ‘The governance of
sustainable development: Taking stock and looking forwards’, Environment and Planning C: Government
and Policy, 26 (2008), pp. 17–33.
51 Bernstein, The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism, p. 53; Giddens, The Politics of Climate Change,
pp. 193–4.
52 J. Szarka, ‘Climate challenges, ecological modernization, and technical forcing: Policy lessons from a
comparative UK-EU Analysis’, Global Environmental Politics, 12:2 (2012), pp. 87–109.
53 European Commission, ‘Europe 2020: Priorities’ (2014), available at: {http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/
europe-2020-in-a-nutshell/priorities/index_en.htm} accessed 20 April 2015.
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on the assumption that meeting tougher climate targets would necessarily involve high
costs of implementing energy transitions which they could ill afford.54 There
are examples also of assumptions about the need to allow for growth beneﬁting
developed countries. Some suggest that the choice of 1990 as the year against which
GHG emissions reduction targets should be compared was made because it suited
certain key counter-parties to the agreement – including Germany and the UK.
Certainly, by March 2007 when the UK agreed to the 20-20-20 targets, it had already
reduced its emissions heavily as a result of a switch from coal to gas during the 1990s
and some de-industrialisation of its economy.55 Measured in this way the UK meets
emissions benchmarking standards and can be counted as a ‘best practice’ country.
Evidence of the way that commitment to growth has further qualiﬁed climate
benchmarks can also be seen in the kind of targets agreed for energy efﬁciency and
embedded within climate benchmarking standards. On the surface the commitment to
a 20 per cent improvement in energy efﬁciency by 2020 looks impressive but it is,
however, somewhat misleading. Firstly, unlike the other two targets the efﬁciency
target is non-binding for individual countries. Secondly, it is measured not in absolute
terms against a certain date, like GHG emissions, but as a reduction in energy
consumption of 20 per cent below the expected energy consumption trend to 2020 and
is, in these ways, a softer target.56 There are a number of ways in which improving
energy efﬁciency, and/or reduction in demand for energy, are considered to be related
to economic growth. Given that growth in demand for energy has historically been
considered a natural precondition of wider economic growth energy efﬁciency can
infer, under some measurements, a reduction in growth.57 For others, efﬁciency
improvements may infer near and medium term costs – DG Ener estimates that the
scale of investment required to meet EU 2020 efﬁciency targets is around €100 billion
annually.58 For many, this raises concerns about affordability and about the effect of
these costs have on domestic households but also on companies’ abilities to compete
internationally. In the longer term, of course, greater energy efﬁciency is speciﬁcally
supposed to allow for a decoupling between economic growth and energy demand
growth.59 Furthermore, for countries like the UK that have indigenous fossil fuel
industries, there are also positive correlations between energy production, exports, tax
receipts, and economic growth. This is one reason why fossil fuel production is still
supported publically (often via tax breaks) in many countries. Although many
organisations, like the International Energy Agency (IEA), have done much to
quantify and discourage these practices, given negative implications for energy
transition and for climate mitigation, such state support for fossil fuels is not
measured directly by climate benchmarks and therefore is allowed.
Environmental campaigners, and some policymakers, have observed that politics
gets in the way of meeting climate benchmarks at the national level as countries
pursue growth over climate governance goals. It is observed, for example, that
certain countries have in the past shied away from meeting targets or have diluted
measures for growth reasons.60 This suggests that meeting climate mitigation
54 DG Climate, ‘The 2020 Climate and Energy Package’ (2014). This is related in turn to the principal of
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities upon which the UNFCCC is based.
55 Garner, Environmental Politics, p. 119.
56 See DG Climate, ‘The 2020 Climate and Energy Package’.
57 Kuzemko, The Energy Security-Climate Nexus, p. 67; Newell and Paterson, Climate Capitalism, pp. 13–15.
58 See DG Ener’s webpage, available at: {https://ec.europa.eu/energy/node/1742} accessed 20 April 2015.
59 Newell and Paterson, Climate Capitalism, p. 14.
60 Compston and Bailey, ‘Geography and the politics of climate change’.
980 Caroline Kuzemko
objectives is understood in some countries as less important than meeting the
objective of economic growth. This might not be a surprising outcome, however,
given observations above that individual country climate targets have been
speciﬁcally constructed with the intention of allowing for economic growth. In
essence these choices are evidence of the softer reformist position having become
embedded in climate benchmarks, thereby also avoiding and silencing other more
radical interpretations of environmental problems and related solutions that
recommend less economic growth and consumption.61
Climate as ‘separate’ from environment but as including energy
The second idea embedded in climate benchmarks, and what they measure, is that
climate change can be considered as a separate area of governance from environment
but as more inter-related with energy as a policy area. Evidence of the split between
environment and climate can be seen in decisions to separate out the climate
Directorate General (DG Clima) from the environmental DG but also in the design of
other climate instruments. For example, by applying GHG emissions as the sole
benchmarking standards CDM projects, that have had detrimental environmental
impacts in the localities where they have been cited, can still be considered a success
when measured from a distance.62 Environmentally negative outcomes are simply not
‘seen’ as they are not pertinent to the measured standards but these impacts affect
local communities in numerous ways.
For many, however, the most important side-effect of narrowly set climate
benchmarks has been that nuclear power can, under such standards, be considered
a ‘clean’ source of energy. It is not just that nuclear power is not seen but that
it is considered by the EU to be a positive contribution to mitigating for climate
change – contrary to the position taken in countries like Germany and Denmark.
Clearly, from an environmental perspective, nuclear energy is potentially the most
devastating form of electricity production available currently but it is also highly
expensive.63 The environmental implications of nuclear have become widely
recognised during times of radioactive leaks for power plants but unanswered
questions of where to store waste post decommissioning remain unanswered and may
pose risks for future generations. As will be seen below, countries like the UK that
produce nuclear are considered to be pursuing best practice whilst Germany, in its
decision to completely phase it out, drop down benchmarks. In this way climate
mitigation is, arguably, prioritised over environment.
Less critical attention has, however, been paid to the ways in which climate
benchmarks, as separate from environment, then proceed to incorporate various
61 For references to other claims that global climate governance silences alternative approaches to envi-
ronment governance. see Bernstein, The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism; B. Richardson, ‘The
governance of primary commodities: Biofuels certiﬁcation in the European Union’, in A. Payne and
N. Phillips (eds), Handbook of the International Political Economy of Governance (Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar, 2014); T. Wanner, ‘The new “passive revolution” of the green economy and growth discourse:
Maintaining the “sustainable development” of neoliberal capitalism’, New Political Economy, 20:1
(2015), pp. 21–41.
62 See Mathur et al., ‘Experiences of host communities with carbon market projects’, and Newell and
Bumpus, ‘The global political ecology of the clean development mechanism’ for details of such projects
and outcomes.
63 A. Froggatt, C. Kuzemko, and E. Rouhaud, ‘The energy security-climate nexus and the environment’, in
C. Mitchell, J. Watson, and J. Whiting (eds), New Challenges in Energy Security: the UK in a Multipolar
World (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
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assumptions about energy and its role in climate mitigation. Although the European
Commission has separate DGs for energy and for climate change, as part of the
creation of the new Energy Union there is now one commissioner for Climate Action
and Energy. EU climate documents frame energy as a problem but also claim that
renewables and efﬁciency, as core elements in a sustainable energy system transition,
offer the primary route to reducing emissions.64 What this article argues, however, is
that what is not ‘seen’ here is the protracted and complex politics of driving energy
policy, so long associated with fossil fuels, towards achieving climate benchmarks.
Meeting even ‘reformist’ EU climate targets implies for most countries profound
changes in energy governance, usage, and systems – albeit not as profound as changes
implied within a radical agenda.
There are two aspects of this that are highlighted here. The ﬁrst is that EU
benchmarks, although they do make allowances for growth, tend not to see the scale
of change required either socially, politically, or even in energy systems.65 There are
multiple separate but interconnected energy systems in place that have a bearing on
how countries comply with targets embedded in benchmarks. Take, for example, the
introduction of more renewable sources of energy into electricity systems. There are a
host of primary and secondary institutions that support electricity systems each with
their own implicit power relations, preferred technologies and abilities to inﬂuence
governance decisions. Introducing more renewable electricity implies billions of euros
of new investment just in new transmission systems, given the variability of renewable
supply, let alone other parts of the electricity system. There are severe contestations
and resistances against this type of change, which countries respond to according to
domestic politics.66
The second aspect of what is not overtly ‘seen’ by benchmarks is the highly
complex and messy politics of energy that need to be navigated in order to meet set
standards. Signiﬁcant political tensions between the EU and member states on energy
policy have been noted elsewhere and although the EU has long worked to establish a
uniﬁed energy policy there remain signiﬁcant loopholes that countries can use to
avoid compliance.67 Article 194 of the Lisbon Treaty gives countries the sovereign
right to choose, amongst other things, their energy mix.68 This pits complying
with renewable targets against not ‘prejudicing’ Member State’s preferences for an
energy mix that reﬂects their speciﬁc national circumstances. What is meant by this,
and how it plays out in practice, is covered in more detail below but it is worth
noting at this stage that both for the EU and for each member state attempts to
meet renewable and efﬁciency targets relate in practice to attempts to meet other
energy objectives.69 These other energy policy objectives include the need to maintain
64 DG Climate, ‘Progress Towards the 2020 Targets: the European Semester’ (2014), available at: {http://ec.
europa.eu/clima/policies/g-gas/progress/index_en.htm} accessed 20 April 2015.
65 For a discussion of the scale of change required, see J. Meadowcroft, ‘Engaging with the politics of
sustainability transitions’, Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 1 (2011), pp. 70–5
(pp. 73–4).
66 See Broome and Quirk, ‘Governing the world at a distance’, p. 11.
67 D. Buchan, ‘Why Europe’s energy and climate policies are coming apart’, Oxford Institute for Energy
Studies, SP 28 (July 2013); C. Kuzemko, ‘Ideas, power and change: Explaining EU-Russia energy
relations’, Journal of European Public Policy, 21:1 (2014), pp. 58–75.
68 European Commission, ‘Consolidated version of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union’,
Ofﬁcial Journal of the European Union (30 March 2010).
69 European Commission, ‘A Roadmap for Moving to a Competitive Low Carbon Economy in 2040’,
Brussels COM(2011) 112/4 Provisional text.
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energy security, to establish competitive markets, and sometimes also to address
serious energy poverty issues.70
In practice, therefore, although the EU and member states do seek to meet climate
benchmarks there are other important but differential hierarchies of what is
considered politically important, plausible, and possible. Assumptions are built into
benchmarks about energy efﬁciency and renewable energy being solutions to both
climate change and energy security problems but again this win-win rhetoric masks
complex interactions between energy policy objectives in practice.71 What then also
becomes important is the wider context within which climate governance sits and
analysis of how governance areas interact with one another, including what priorities
are chosen, within processes of compliance with benchmarks.
Member state compliance
One of the puzzles outlined in the introduction to this article is that Germany ranks
similarly to, or in some instances much lower than, the UK in climate benchmarks
and this section explains in more detail why such rankings seem questionable to many
climate scholars (see Table 1 for rankings).
The EEA’s latest climate benchmark, in ranking Germany and the UK highly,
infers that these are countries whose example should be followed. If these countries
are held to be model reformers a critical exploration of the politics of compliance is
indeed a useful exercise – especially given that climate mitigation is a relatively
untested area of governance where much learning will need to take place. The
importance of national compliance has been emphasised elsewhere in that
international targets are understood to have little effect on emissions until policies
are introduced at the national level.72 The politics of compliance is also taken here as
important as EU member states, often as part of negotiating blocks, have much to say
about what should and should not be measured in future based upon national
experiences with complying.
Given also that climate targets and benchmarks are intended to set a new direction
against which countries can be measured it is worth noting that, even against
reformist targets, EU benchmarks do reveal some slippage. Measured compliance
with EU GHG emissions reduction targets show that although the aggregate EU
emissions reduction target for 2020 is likely to be met, 13 member states may not meet
CPPI 2014 EEA 2013 Efﬁciency EEA 2013 Renewables EEA 2013 Emissions
Germany 19th Good Progress Indicative targets met Mixed Progress
UK 2nd (5th) Some Progress Indicative targets not met Good Progress
Note: Germanwatch’s CPPI does not assign positions 1 to 3 to any countries – they consider that no
countries are doing enough to prevent dangerous climate change. As such the UK is at position 5 but it
comes second relative to all other countries covered.
Table 1. German and UK Performance in CPPI and EEA benchmarks
70 The EU’s formal energy policy objectives are: competition, energy security, and climate mitigation.
71 Froggatt et al., ‘The energy security-climate nexus and the environment’.
72 N. Carter, ‘Climate change and the politics of the global environment’, in M. Beeson and N. Bisley (eds),
Issues in Twenty-ﬁrst Century World Politics (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010),
p. 57; Compston and Bailey, ‘Comparing Climate Policies’, p. 3.
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their individual emissions targets.73 In this way the performance of some countries
subsidises other non-performers. Aggregate EU and individual member state
compliance with renewable energy targets is yet more mixed, and even worse is
energy efﬁciency compliance, albeit efﬁciency targets are non-binding.74 Failure to
meet these ‘weak’ targets may have signiﬁcance given the EU’s ‘leadership’ position in
climate negotiations and commitment to climate mitigation.
German compliance: the ‘Green’ reformer
EEA climate benchmarks tell us that Germany, on the latest measurable data, is
making good progress towards meeting EU targets – especially with regard to
renewable energy.75 It has for some time been qualiﬁed as one of the best EU
countries in compliance terms – although it has slipped recently on emissions
measurements for reasons to be explained below.76 As already suggested, however,
what is not seen by benchmarks is the amount of work, in terms of policies and
institution building, that has already gone into meeting these targets. Germany, unlike
most other countries in the world including the UK, is already in ‘phase II’, the
Energiewende, of its energy transition.77 The Energiewende is speciﬁcally designed to
facilitate a sustainable transition by 2050: it contains a GHG emissions reduction
target of 80 to 95 per cent and a reduction in primary energy use of 50 per cent. These
targets are notable in that they are both measured against 2008 rather than the ‘easier’
date of 1990 and therefore infer a high degree of change. It also includes one of the
most ambitious renewable energy targets of 60 per cent of ﬁnal consumption.78 What
this shows is long-term commitment above and beyond EU benchmarks – something
that is neither seen nor rewarded because benchmarks only measure against EU
agreed targets and as such only recognise, on an annual basis, success in meeting
these. Ambitious climate targets can be understood as part of the broader German
history of having tougher environmental targets than the EU.79
What compliance emphasises is that having targets is really only a starting point
and that learning how to meet them is the important part. Here Germany is widely
held up, in more qualitative climate analyses, as a clear leader. For example,
Germany’s feed-in-tariff (FiT), the principal support mechanism for renewable
energy, has been highly successful, not least in that it has offered a risk-free return for
new renewable production. Germany has also supported renewable production by
ruling that transmission systems must give priority access to renewables over other
sources of electricity.80 These conditions have made it possible for a high degree of
73 DG Climate, ‘Progress Towards the 2020 Targets: the European Semester’ (2014), available at: {http://ec.
europa.eu/clima/policies/g-gas/progress/index_en.htm} accessed 20 April 2015; European Environment
Agency, ‘Trends and Projections in Europe’.
74 European Environment Agency, ‘Trends and Projections in Europe’, p. 124.
75 Ibid., various pages.
76 Ibid., p. 111.
77 Phase one being the ‘Energy Concept’ and Renewable Energy Act of 2000, see G. Fuchs, N. Hinderer,
G. Kungl, and M. Neukirch, ‘Adaptive Capacities, Path Creation and Variants of Sectoral Change: the
Case of the Transformation of the German Energy Supply System’, SOI Discussion Paper 2012-02
(2012), p. 19.
78 Agora Energiewende, ‘12 Insights on Germany’s Energiewende’, Agora Energiewende Discussion Paper
010/03-1-2013/EN (2013), p. 1.
79 V. Schmidt, Democracy in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 145.
80 D. Jacobs, ‘The German Energiewende: History, targets, policies and challenges’, Renewable Energy Law
and Policy, 3:4 (2012), pp. 223–34.
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small-scale but also widely distributed production to be developed in Germany
approximating more closely the environmental ideal of community and/or local
energy production. Although benchmarks show that Germany is meeting its
renewable targets this more sustainable aspect of how renewable energy is
produced is neither measured nor rewarded by EU climate benchmarks. Ability to
comply here is also important in that Germany is a now strong supporter of extending
binding renewable energy targets at the EU integrated and member country level to
2030 and 2050.81
In attempting to explain why Germany has been more successful in supporting
renewable energy comparative analyses suggest that as a ‘co-ordinated market economy’
Germany has already had in place the kinds of institutions that allow for and support
this kind of long run but difﬁcult and constantly renegotiated change.82 Not only has
there been considerable public investment in research and development of new systems
they have also had better coordinated processes for deliberation and negotiation in
support of new, but sometimes contentious, policies. This is partly also because
Germany has recognised the need for speciﬁc institutions to enable a sustainable
transition. The well-capitalised German development bank, the KfW, has been directed
to lend to sustainability projects at very low interest rates and then reinvest proceeds
back into more sustainability projects.83 Furthermore Germany has a more deeply
embedded municipal movement that has supported the many local energy projects that
have developed across Germany, albeit more speciﬁc to some Länder than others. Some
also argue that the costs of energy transition are more fairly distributed to the extent that
those that are impacted are better supported by the German welfare system with positive
implications for energy poverty.84 This has all been further underpinned by the fact that
all political parties, as well as large sections of the German electorate, support climate
change mitigation, energy system transition, as well as other environmental issues.85
Beyond this institutional terrain a close analysis of the politics of compliance
reveals deep complications. This is where we pick up again on some of the
qualiﬁcations to climate benchmarks outlined above. One assumption built into
climate benchmarks is that climate targets are the drivers for cleaner energy policy
and systems. Historically, however, improvements in energy sustainability have been
a means of responding not to climate but to energy security fears. It has also been
suggested that much of what has been achieved in Germany, and other countries like
Sweden, has been related to their lack of indigenous energy supply and the fact that
they have historically been heavy fossil fuel importers. The argument runs that the
initial impetus for some measures was to reduce dependence, and thereby increase
supply security, in response to crises such as the 1970s oil shocks.86 In not recognising
81 See D. Buchan and M. Keay, ‘The EU’s Energy and Climate Goals for 2030: Under-Ambitious and
Over-Bearing’, Oxford Energy Comment (January 2014).
82 Mikler and Harrison, ‘Varieties of capitalism and technological innovation’; M. Lockwood,
C. Kuzemko, C. Mitchell, and R. Hoggett, ‘Theorising Governance and Innovation in Sustainable
Energy Transitions’, EPG Working Paper No. 1304 (2013), available at: {http://projects.exeter.ac.uk/
igov/working-paper-theorising-governance-and-innovation-in-sustainable-energy-transitions/} accessed
20 April 2015.
83 For an assessment of the KfW Bank’s role in facilitating system change, see M. Schröder, P. Ekins,
A. Power, M. Zulauf, and R. Lowe, ‘The KfW Experience in the Reduction of Energy Use in and CO2
Emissions From Buildings: Operation, Impacts and Lessons for the UK’, UCL Working Paper
(November 2011).
84 M. Lockwood, ‘The Political Dynamics of Green Transformations’, Exeter Energy Policy Group
Working Paper No. 1404 (April 2014).
85 Giddens, The Politics of Climate Change, p. 76.
86 Ibid., p. 37.
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different drivers for change climate benchmarks see only a small portion of relevant
decision-making around energy policy.
A second embedded assumption that has an impact on how Germany is judged is
that climate can be separated from environment. There has been a long-standing
debate in Germany about nuclear power – in the early 2000s it was agreed that
nuclear power, despite environmental objections, could act as a short-term, low
carbon bridge to a future where energy consumption would be lower and renewables
the primary source.87 In 2011, it was decided that nuclear would be phased out by
2022 – a controversial as well as momentous decision that reﬂects a more
environmentally informed standpoint on energy production.88 Nuclear power in
2011, however, still accounted for 17.7 per cent of Germany’s electricity supply and
this has therefore inferred profound short and medium term changes to energy policy
and systems – not least in that its options for electricity production have narrowed. In
the short-term, to accommodate for nuclear power shortfalls, Germany has been
producing more electricity from coal and for this reason fell foul of emissions
measurements.89 By extension, however, this also places the need to develop
renewable energy quickly absolutely central within German climate and energy policy
and infers economic and political costs – the ramiﬁcations of which are currently very
high proﬁle. EU climate benchmarks, because they do not measure environmental
impacts, only see the withdrawal from nuclear as negative decision in that it has
implications for near-term emissions. The EU, for its part, is critical of Germany’s
stance on nuclear and the degree to which Germany subsidises renewable energy
production.90 In this benchmarks are both near-sighted, in that they do not account
for longer-term commitments, but also because in only recognising emissions, but not
other environmental impacts of energy, they allow and even reward potentially
damaging practices thereby storing up future problems. This shows the impact, in
practice, of prioritising climate over environment in this way.
Despite Germany’s position as one of the most progressive in terms of action to
mitigate for climate change there has always been deep seated opposition but the
German Parliament’s resolution in addressing this is not rewarded. The ‘Big 4’ gas
and electricity companies, the coal sector, and some heavy industry companies have
mounted, and continue to mount, sustained attacks on green energy policy
decisions.91 As a mark of German parliamentary commitment to sustainable
transition and renewables, MPs have actively defended renewable policies against
the ‘Big4’.92
Those that oppose the Energiewende today use the economic costs associated
with rapid energy transition to argue against further support. Opponents of
renewables place the blame for high-energy prices in Germany on the cost of
support mechanisms which are passed on to customers.93 One report argues
that Germany has lost €15 billion annually in trade due to premium energy prices
87 D. Buchan, ‘The Energiewende – Germany’s gamble’, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, SP 26 (June
2012), p. 3; Fuchs et al., ‘Adaptive Capacities, Path Creation and Variants of Sectoral Change’, p. 19.
88 As does the decision to limit bio-energy to less than 10 per cent of power generation in the long term. See
Agora, ‘12 Insights on Germany’s Energiewende’, p. 5.
89 European Environment Agency, ‘Trends and Projections in Europe’.
90 Buchan, ‘Why Europe’s energy and climate policies are coming apart’, p. 2.
91 Fuchs et al., ‘Adaptive Capacities, Path Creation and Variants of Sectoral Change’, p. 21.
92 S. Jacobsson and V. Lauber, ‘The politics and policy of energy system transformation – explaining the
German diffusion of renewable energy technology’, Energy Policy, 24 (2006), pp. 256–76 (pp. 265–6).
93 Fuchs et al., ‘Adaptive Capacities, Path Creation and Variants of Sectoral Change’, p. 19.
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faced by industry.94 This is despite the fact that, in terms of heavy industry,
concessions have been made.95 The economic costs of transition, as well as other
system costs are not passed on to car, chemicals, and steel industries in the same way
as they are to other, especially residential, electricity consumers.96 In these ways we
see some relative priorities come to light: energy transition is not prioritised over
heavy industry, historically such a large part of German GDP, on the grounds of
economic growth and international competitiveness arguments. Allowing for growth
in this way is, however, in line with assumptions about sustainability that are built
into benchmarks and as such countries are free to follow this path.
What this shows is that even pursuing a reformist climate agenda in a relatively
well committed country is, in practice, highly political as well as signiﬁcant for other
governance areas. The future of the Energiewende at the moment appears viable, but
new opposition has started to mount as economic costs, as currently distributed,
impact upon domestic over industrial users. Most recent changes have been to pull
back on the generous FiT system – although priority access for renewables remains in
place – partly also in response to EU pressures to reduce state support levels. Their
future ability to meet emissions targets will hang on how successful they are in
balancing nuclear phase out with renewable development and demand reduction. In
this they are facing unprecedented but deeply difﬁcult decisions – their experiences
may provide useful learning for countries that are considering a similar route.
According to climate benchmarks, all this commitment of political capital in the face
of opposition is simply not relevant thereby making energy system transition in
pursuit of climate mitigation appear technical and straightforward.
UK compliance: Reluctant reformer meets status quo
As we have seen, the UK is assigned a position in ofﬁcial EEA benchmarks similar to
Germany and, as such, it is also often held up as a leader in acting to mitigate for
climate change. In assigning the UK a position well ahead of Germany the CCPI
index suggests that it is much better at climate mitigation. By contrast, however, and
as already suggested in the introduction to this article, comparative analyses of
climate governance are more critical of the UK’s approach to climate mitigation. EU
climate benchmarks arguably see even less of the politics of UK compliance, in
particular the internal contestations even of reformist EU targets. For example,
although the UK has historically performed well against emissions reduction targets it
is argued that these achievements have mainly been based on the large-scale switch
from coal to gas that took place in the 1990s as well as on the recession that started in
2008, but less on proactive policymaking.97 In fact, estimated ﬁgures for 2012 show a
rise in UK GHG emissions due to a switch back to coal driven by the relatively low
coal versus gas prices but benchmarks, given the time lag, only see such deterioration
years later.98 In addition not only is UK’s 2020 renewable energy target of 15 per cent
lower than Germany’s 18 per cent it is also, at 5.6 per cent in 2013, still a long way off
94 J. Vasagar, ‘Germany Told of Billions Lost to Trade Due to Energy Policy’, Financial Times
(26 February 2014).
95 Giddens, The Politics of Climate Change, p. 195.
96 Buchan, ‘Why Europe’s energy and climate policies are coming apart’, p. 4.
97 D. Helm, Energy, the State and the Market: British Energy Policy Since 1979 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003).
98 European Environment Agency, ‘Trends and Projections in Europe’, p. 33
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reaching it.99 Climate benchmarks in this way reward the UK for lowering emissions
and making progress towards renewable targets but fail to make any relative
judgement in favour of Germany’s progress in meeting tougher renewable targets than
the UK.
Another reason for the relative favouring of the UK within EU benchmarks, as
currently constructed, might be that the UK’s orientation toward target setting is
more in line with the EU. The Labour government, under Gordon Brown, adopted a
legally binding emissions reduction target of 80 per cent by 2050 as part of the
Climate Change Act and this has been held up as best practice. Although it should be
noted that the 80 per cent ﬁgure is measured against 1990 levels and is therefore not a
commitment comparable to that being made by Germany. In order to meet these
objectives new institutions have recently been established, such as the Department for
Energy and Climate Change (DECC) and the Green Bank and a plethora of new
white papers, strategies, bills, and acts of parliament has also ensued. Broadly
speaking, however, the UK is still in phase one of a weak reformist programme on
climate mitigation. A return to climate and energy policy literatures suggests that the
UK’s new climate targets and recent governance changes have been less successful at
driving actual changes in the energy system.100 This infers that target setting and
energy system change do not necessarily go hand in hand but also that there should be
greater questions posed about the UK’s status as ‘best practice’ in climate mitigation.
One prominent explanation given for relatively disappointing energy system
change has been that the UK has placed a comparatively greater regulatory and
policy emphasis on other energy policy goals, such as liberalising and privatising
markets, and on the role of markets in delivering sustainable transition and energy
services more broadly.101 In the 1990s as privatisation progressed responsibility for
energy was passed to private enterprise and the UK closed energy departments down
thereby arguably limiting civil service and wider government energy sector
knowledge. Privatisation for some has also fostered an oligopoly of private gas and
electricity companies, the ‘Big 6’, which have been reluctant to change and which have
had a high degree of inﬂuence over policy and regulation.102
This relative stance versus stated political intentions to transition to a sustainable
energy system stands in strict contrast to German parliamentary standing down of
large utilities. One example of corporate inﬂuence over UK policymaking has been
the recent government decision to pull back on energy efﬁciency obligations that had
been placed on energy companies in response to popular sensitivity to rising prices.
This was a consummate piece of deﬂection by the Big 6 given that, at the time, many
market and political commentators were pointing the ﬁnger at energy corporates as
culpable for the price increases not climate policies. The fact that the UK government
gave way so easily on efﬁciency policy prioritises suggests that powerful industries
and popular opinion about the price of energy are considered more important than
climate mitigation.
99 Department of Energy & Climate Change, ‘Renewable sources of energy: Chapter 6, Digest of United
Kingdom Energy Statistics (DUKES)’ (London: DECC, 2015).
100 See C. Mitchell, The Political Economy of Sustainable Energy (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2008) for an in-depth analysis of UK sustainable energy policy and disappointing changes in
actual practices in the energy system.
101 See, for example, Mitchell, The Political Economy of Sustainable Energy; Giddens, The Politics of
Climate Change; see also various chapters in I. Scrase and G. MacKerron (eds), Energy for the Future: A
New Agenda (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
102 Lockwood et al., ‘Theorising Governance and Innovation in Sustainable Energy Transitions’.
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This analysis of the politics of UK compliance highlights, again, the importance of
notions of energy security as drivers for change but also as capable of inﬂuencing
choices between low carbon forms of energy. For a period, mainly in the 1990s, the
UK was not only able to cover its domestic needs for oil and gas but was also able to
export fossil fuels and this reduced its exposure to security of supply issues. It wasn’t
until the mid 2000s, when becoming a fossil fuel importer again coincided with other
international energy events, that the UK became highly aware of such concerns and
made energy security, alongside climate change, a priority energy policy objective.
The resulting political emphasis on ‘home-grown’ energy, as capable of improving
security, has been utilised by the nuclear industry to push for government support for
new UK nuclear power stations. Contrary to observations about the UK’s
commitment to markets, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Government have
agreed to long-term, ﬁxed prices, at double the market rate, for nuclear electricity.103
This suggests a prioritising of energy security and nuclear over renewables given that
new nuclear will provide for the low carbon element that would otherwise have had to
come from renewables. EU benchmarks not only allow for nuclear, given its low
carbon credentials, but do not see the ways in which commitment to nuclear can
reduce commitment to renewables.
When considering a country’s ability to comply existing energy systems and
infrastructures are also important.104 The UK’s historic ability to earn export
revenues from fossil fuel exports, embedded infrastructures and associated sunk costs
impact upon existing power relations in energy and give succour to arguments against
energy transition. The UK, furthermore, supports the domestic fossil fuel industry
with billions of pounds of subsidies and tax breaks.105 There has been a recent
decision to design the most generous taxation system on offer for shale gas to facilitate
indigenous exploration and development as well as to establish a new Oil and Gas
Agency to facilitate maximum possible extraction of oil and gas in the UK.106 These
are all directly framed not only as being necessary in order to secure energy security
but also to secure economic growth, or more precisely recovery. Such investment in
fossil fuels to support economic growth is allowable under current constructions of
EU benchmarks and standards as well as in line with the UK’s own deﬁnitions of
sustainability.107 As such, decisions affecting compliance with climate targets are not
just about an over-reliance on markets but also about inter-actions between energy
policy objectives of emissions reduction, supply security and the objective of economic
growth. Although the European Commission has had much to say about UK nuclear
subsidies,108 the EEA’s benchmarks do not mark the UK down for actively
supporting fossil fuel expansion that is detrimental to climate change mitigation.
103 See the Gov.UK website, ‘Initial Agreement Reached on New Nuclear Power Station at Hinkley’, Press
Release (21 October 2013), available at: {https://www.gov.uk/government/news/initial-agreement-
reached-on-new-nuclear-power-station-at-hinkley}.
104 See G. Unruh, ‘Understanding carbon lock-in’, Energy Policy, 28 (2000), pp. 817–30 for a discussion of
carbon path-dependencies or ‘lock-in’.
105 House of Commons Environmental Committee, Energy Subsidies: HC61 (London: the Stationary Ofﬁce
2013), p. 3. The UK is, however, uncertain in reality about how much it spends on subsidising energy
including nuclear, fossil fuels, and renewables – or even how this should be measured. The investigation
into subsidies is still ongoing.
106 BBC News, ‘Aberdeen to be Home for New Oil and Gas Agency’, available at: {http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-27809836} accessed 20 April 2015.
107 Kuzemko, The Energy Security-Climate Nexus, p. 98.
108 P. Johnstone, ‘European Commission Critique of UK Nuclear Strategy’, Sussex Energy Group Blog
(11 February 2014), available at: {http://sussexnrggrp.wordpress.com/2014/02/11/the-potential-for-a-
hinkley-shaped-hole-in-uk-energy-infrastructure/} accessed 20 April 2015.
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This support is simply not seen and, in this way, questions benchmarks in both
efﬁcacy and credibility terms.
In terms of choices regarding energy mix, that is what sources should be
prioritised, this is far from a coherent transition agenda. By contrast by rejecting
nuclear and emphasising renewables Germany has made choices about technology
pathways and this is important in that it then allows other decisions to be made about
what associated energy system changes will be needed. The UK has not made ﬁrm
decisions about energy sources in that everything is still on the table but it also does
not have any renewable energy targets beyond EU 2020, certainly not binding ones.
By not choosing variable renewable over steady-state, coal, gas and nuclear,
electricity supply the UK has to maintain transmission and distribution systems that
cater to both – arguably a more expensive option in the long run. This lack of
commitment to renewable energy has underpinned recent attempts to convince the
European Commission that no binding renewable targets should be placed on
member states as part of the 2030 framework thereby seeking to alter the metrics
against which climate benchmarks measure compliance. In these ways, although the
UK is judged as similar to or better than Germany, it should be described as more
status quo even than reformist at the moment and should not, perhaps, be held up as a
model of climate mitigation performance.
Conclusion
This analysis has, by adopting a constructivist IPE approach, been able to reveal the
many ways in which climate benchmarks, as currently constructed, have implications
for which countries are held up as leaders, how compliance is undertaken, as well as
complex inter-linkages with other policy areas. By narrowing down what is measured
to numbers reﬂecting certain, soft targets Germany becomes, in one benchmark, less
of a model climate reformer than the UK – encouraging other countries to follow UK
practices. This is problematic to the extent that other, more qualitative, analyses claim
that UK climate and energy governance is in many respects less effective than
Germany’s. There are issues here of temporality, to the extent that each benchmark
assessment exercise focuses only on one year, and of scale of ambition, in that targets
accepted tend to delineate the boundaries of climate ambition expected of each
country – we will return to these issues below. Largely this is a case of benchmarks
reﬂecting an acceptance of what is held to be achievable based on today’s politico-
economic models while glossing over more thorny but none-the-less equally important
issues for climate mitigation and sidelining radical alternatives. This is not so
surprising given that, once recognised as a global issue that must be addressed, it has
fallen to pre-existing international institutions to take action but may not bode well
for long-term climate mitigation.
The approach taken here has departed from some constructivist IPE approaches
to the extent that climate governance and benchmarks have been conceptualised as
informed simultaneously by multiple, varied ideas. In particular there has been an
emphasis on revealing the internal contradictions that occur between intentions to
drive sustainable behaviour change and those behaviours benchmarks actively reward
and those that they ignore. A number of speciﬁc issues have been highlighted – one is
that climate benchmarks infer an active but sadly limited inter-relationship between
policy areas. The only explicitly recognised link between policy areas is that between
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energy and climate policy but the way in which energy is included in climate
benchmarks ignores other aspects of energy policy that are equally important to the
success of climate mitigation strategies. Countries are understood to be following best
practice if they successfully pursue sustainable energy policies but they are not directly
discouraged from supporting fossil fuels given that such energy policies are simply not
seen. Some links between climate and other policy areas are broken, for instance with
environmental policy allowing for climate choices that are in effect environmentally
damaging, whilst other links are simply inferred such as those between economic
growth objectives and meeting climate targets.
A second point of departure from climate governance literatures has been to
consider compliance in two developed countries in order to make explicit how
different domestic and institutional contexts inter-react with international standards
and inﬂuence different compliance paths. This analysis has revealed nuanced
differences in German and UK climate governance – not least Germany’s greater
commitment to long-term energy system transition as opposed to the UK’s tendency
to attempt to comply rather than lead but also to question even existing, soft targets.
Indeed reifying economic growth benchmarks in essence allows countries, like the
UK, to object to climate mitigation agendas on precisely those grounds. For example
there has been heavy objection from the UK over renewable energy’s place within EU
2030 targets as well as over the inclusion of efﬁciency targets.109 By conceptualising
EU climate governance as ﬂuid and as involving two-way relationships with member
states we can therefore understand that current benchmarking constructions, and the
contestations they engender and allow, become part of their future construction.
For those from a radical environmental standpoint missed targets and
disagreement over the near-term future might be all too predictable but that still
leaves the international community with the ever more desperate need to meet the 2˚C
limit and to further institutionalise behavioural change. The suggestion here is to
more overtly recognise precise ways, outlined above, in which benchmarks are
currently limited in their ability to recognise effective climate mitigation strategies.
Once such limits are made more overt there could be two basic options for
proceeding: one would be to take benchmarks with a large pinch of salt and not use
them to quantify ‘best practice’ but this would necessitate greater structural reforms
given their central role in measuring compliance with binding EU targets. In the
absence of such reforms the second option would be to improve their construction.
Benchmarks might, for example, be altered to include new standards against which
each country’s climate performance can be measured, not least standards that can
reﬂect how fossil fuel production and use is developing in each country. New
standards that measure the degree to which countries are managing to decouple
economic growth from energy demand growth, and or measure each country’s
longer-term progress and future commitment to climate mitigation might also be
considered. These suggestions are based on the analysis undertaken here, but should
by no means be taken as a complete list.
Devising these would require further knowledge building about the complex detail
of how benchmarks are constructed and how different nations interpret and comply
with climate benchmarks in practice. From a theoretical viewpoint taking an
approach that better reveals embedded ideas and interrogates how they relate to
109 See O. Geden and S. Fischer, ‘Moving Targets: Negotiations on the EU’s Energy and Climate Policy
Objectives for the Post-2020 Period and Implications for the German Energy Transition’, SWP Research
Paper, RP3 (March 2014).
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policy constructions has arguably allowed for a more honest and realistic assessment
of climate governance. More such analysis might be useful in further revealing
complex constructions of climate governance and varieties of compliance and make
more overt what political choices are being made and the hierarchies between
economic, energy, environmental, and climate objectives these choices infer. Such
knowledge, if it were to be made more readily available, would allow voting publics to
know more about what compromises governments are making (and need to make) in
their name. All these observations imply that what is needed here is a reﬂexive
political learning process, instead of assuming that answers are already known and
can be technically measured, especially given the unprecedented nature of governing
for climate mitigation and complex system transition.
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